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Abstract² As organisations move away from locally hosted 
computer services toward Cloud platforms, there is a 
corresponding need to ensure the forensic integrity of such 
instances. The primary reasons for concern are (i) the locus of 
responsibility, and (ii) the associated risk of legal sanction and 
financial penalty. Building upon previously proposed 
techniques for intrusion monitoring, we highlight the multi-
level interpretation problem, propose enhanced monitoring of 
Cloud-based systems at diverse operational and data storage 
level as a basis for review of historical change across the hosted 
system and afford scope to identify any data impact from 
KRVWLOHDFWLRQRUµIULHQGO\ILUH¶ 
Keywords-Cloud security; forensic readiness; message 
authentication codes; secret sharing. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For many individuals, the primary use of Cloud 
computing is remote data storage. Presently, most major 
online Cloud service providers offer such storage. Apple 
users may engage iCloud as a supplement to local storage 
capacity and as an emergency backup for system 
configuration. Among similar service offerings we find 
Google Drive, Microsoft OneDrive and Amazon Drive. 
Dropbox and its freemium business model, where users 
may register for a free account with a limited storage size 
and an option for more storage capacity and additional 
features for paid subscriptions, is also very popular. The 
broad appeal and immediate benefits from services of this 
type are apparent from the proliferation of such offerings, as 
underlined by the fact that many home broadband contracts 
include a measure of Cloud storage as standard7KXV³BT 
Cloud is a free service for BT Broadband customers that 
allows you to securely back up, access and share your 
precious files and folders´ [1]. Home broadband users will 
often rely on their remote storage and backup facility with 
little recognition that Cloud services are in operation. 
Despite the apparent speed with which consumers have 
adopted Cloud-based services, there is recognition that 
security issues can arise in the Cloud setting just as in the 
context of locally hosted systems [2, 3, 4, and 5]. When 
occasional security issues are reported in the media, the 
greatest concern may be the availability and privacy of their 
data [e.g., 6].  
II. NETWORK SECURITY RISKS 
Addressing security risks is a familiar issue in the context 
of networked computing. In non-Cloud systems, the 
principal ingredients in management responses to security 
take three general forms: 
 
x System hardening 
 
x Software defences 
 
x Data backup 
 
Firstly, system hardening is an attempt to render known 
threats ineffective. This includes µFRQYHQWLRQDO¶ PHDVXUHV
that reduce vulnerability, such as authentication, identity 
management and access control [7], as well as acting to 
disable unnecessary services, applying regular software 
updates (patches) and gauging of the relevance and 
associated risks from newly published exploits [8]. Modern 
Operating Systems have also been adapted to meet known 
cyber threats. Counter measures, like address space 
randomisation, mandatory access control or maybe 
sandboxing, are state of the art. In addition, advanced users 
might even build their own operating system and use 
selected kernel parameters to further harden their system. 
The second variety of response to address security issues is 
the application of software defences. This ranges from 
antivirus provision to firewalls and may also include some 
variety of intrusion detection, usually rule-based [9] or 
anomaly-based [10].  
Any computing system may be described by a simple 
layer-based model as depicted in Fig. 1. Obviously, security 
on any higher layer strongly depends on access control 
mechanisms of lower layers. Even if users or service 
providers only aim for access control on a higher level to 
secure their application, these access control mechanisms in 
practice are more complex than those on lower layers. In 
addition, vulnerabilities or inadequate configuration on lower 
levels may lead to bypassing security measures on higher 
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Figure 1: Layer-based model of a computing system 
layers. Therefore, appropriate countermeasures are necessary 
on all layers. 
A third security measure is the provision of regular data 
backup, as a means of ensuring that any system failure or 
intrusion does not result in irretrievable data loss.  
III. CLOUD SECURITY RISKS 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Cloud configurations are subject 
to levels of security risk that go beyond those affecting 
conventional networked computer systems. In consequence, 
the security measures outlined above may not be sufficient in 
the Cloud setting. In elaborating this claim, the Cloud issues 
are best illustrated with reference to the differing Cloud 
service offerings [11]: 
x Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS); 
x Platform as a Service (PaaS); 
x Software as a Service (SaaS). 
These models for Cloud service provision are helpfully 
elucidated by Gibson, et. al. [12], as follows:  
 
x ³IaaS provides users with a web-based service that 
can be used to create, destroy, and manage virtual 
machines and storage. It can be used to meter the 
use of resources over a period of time which in turn 
can be billed back to users at a negotiated rate. It 
alleviates the users of the responsibility of 
managing the physical and virtualized 
infrastructure, while still retaining control over the 
operating system, configuration, and software 
UXQQLQJRQWKHYLUWXDOPDFKLQHV´ [op. cit., p. 199].  
x ³3ODWIRUP-as-a-Service providers offer access to 
APIs, programming languages and development 
middleware which allows subscribers to develop 
custom applications without installing or 
configuring the development environmentā  [op. 
cit., p. 200].  
x ³Software-as-a-Service gives subscribed or pay-per-
use users access to software or services that reside 
LQWKHFORXGDQGQRWRQWKHXVHU¶Vdeviceā [op. cit., 
p. 202]. 
Clearly, our earlier noted approaches to system security 
are also applicable to Cloud-based systems. With an eye 
specifically on Cloud security, we can consider how each of 
these service offerings may be at risk and what precautions 
may be anticipated in response to these risks.  
 
1. Infrastructure as a Service 
This kind of service seems most prone to the types of 
exploit that one would expect with conventional networked 
computers, principally, because, in most cases, such virtual 
machines will be presented to the Internet as networked 
hosts. Here, the customer is deploying a virtual machine with 
associated Operating System and on-board software 
applications. This raises the prospect of vulnerabilities at 
network level, as well as application level issues, e.g., with 
Web systems and Database servers, Cross-Site Scripting 
(XSS) or SQL injections.  Denial of service attacks are also a 
legitimate concern, especially since this kind of attack can 
achieve enormous bandwidths by using IoT devices for their 
purpose [13]. For these reasons, system hardening 
(especially, defending against known vulnerabilities) and 
software defences are appropriate for IaaS, including 
precautions such as anti-malware, firewalls, and Intrusion 
Detection Systems. Provision of these features may be the 
responsibility of the Cloud Service Provider (CSP), who 
determines what OS and defensive capabilities are made 
available. In some settings, the customer may be in a position 
to bolster the native defences on the virtual system provided 
by the CSP.  
In similar vein, data backup is likely to be required by 
the IaaS customer. Indeed, the protection of customer data 
may jointly be the concern of the customer and the CSP.  
The former may enable off-Cloud backup, to avoid a single 
source of failure. While the CSP may also offer data backup 
to a separate Cloud data storage facility. 
Despite reasonable expectation of such measures, there 
are indications that Cloud software infrastructure 
components are not always adequately secured from known 
vulnerabilities at the virtual machine level [14]. 
 
2. Platform as a Service 
Computing facilities afforded to the customer of PaaS, 
are limited to the development of specific middleware or 
functional components. These services employ technologies 
such as Docker [15], Containers [16], DevOps [17] and 
AWS Lambda [18], in order to host customer-defined remote 
functionality. From a Cloud customer perspective, system 
hardening seems to be irrelevant in this context in relation to 
the host Operating System. On the other hand, any code 
developed for use on the Cloud platform must be protected 
from illicit operations, e.g., process hijacking, output 
redirection or the elevation of privileges.   
Software defences of the variety outlined above seem less 
relevant to the PaaS context since the operations supported 
by the middleware are limited to specific data processing and 
do not afford full operating system access or modification. 
The primary concern should be the operational effectiveness 
and resilience of the customer-defined operations. Clearly, 
such services may also be impaired through illicit access, 
e.g., stealing authentication details in order to alter code on 
the host system. Managing this area of concern lies primarily 
in the hands of the Cloud customer, with the assumption that 
the CSP will prevent unauthorised access to customer 
account details. 
 
3. Software as a Service 
SaaS provides the Cloud customer with remote access to 
third-party data processing facilities via micro-services [19], 
or RESTful services [20]. Aside from network level attacks, 
such services should be protected from most other security 
concerns by having the host system hardened and equipped 
with suitable software defences. From the customer 
perspective, so long as their remote Cloud services operate 
effectively, without interruption or data loss, there would 
seem to be little cause for concern.  Of course, the risk of 
aberrant customer-side behaviour may arise through social 
engineering exploits or disgruntled employee actions. 
 
This summary of security concerns affecting the three 
varieties of service has treated each Cloud model as an 
isolated networked computing facility.  In reality, since the 
essence of Cloud provision is the virtualisation of services, 
our overview lacks one further important consideration, i.e., 
the possibility of service impairment as a result of activity at 
adjacent, upper or lower levels of the Cloud implementation.  
Clearly, any security aspects that affect the operational 
resilience of the underlying Cloud infrastructure is of direct 
concern to the CSP and can have a knock-on effect upon 
customer services.  The underlying Cloud technology, i.e., 
the hardware and software configurations that provision our 
three Cloud models, may be subject to attack or deliberate 
manipulation in a fashion that impinges detrimentally upon 
the Cloud services supported by that particular hardware and 
software ensemble. This may be construed as a service attack 
µIURP EHORZ¶ The scope for such attacks are precisely the 
characteristic exploits that may affect any networked host 
(listed earlier). 
Attacks µIURP WKHVLGH¶DUHDJURZLQJFRQFHUQ LQ&ORXG
security. µSide channel attacks¶ RULJLQDWH ZLWK FR-hosted 
customers who manipulate the behaviour of their virtual 
system to influence the behaviour of the host system and 
thereby affect co-hosted customers.  Several studies suggest 
that such µco-WHQDQF\¶, an essential feature of IaaS and PaaS, 
carries dangers.  Thus, ³Physical co-residency with other 
tenants poses a particular risk´ [21], such as ³FDFKH-based 
side-channel attacks´ [22], and ³resource-freeing attacks 
(RFAs)´LQZKLFK³WKH goal is to modify the work- load of a 
victim VM in a way that frees up resources for the at- 
WDFNHU¶V90´ [23].  Most worrying are contexts where one 
customer¶V µPDOLFLRXV¶ virtual machine seeks to extract 
LQIRUPDWLRQIURPDQRWKHUFXVWRPHU¶VYLUWXDOPDFKLQHon the 
same Cloud platform [24]. Such risks to Cloud facilities are 
fundamental to their service provision.  
A final attack vector that threatens some Cloud systems 
LV µIURP DERYH¶ ,Q WKLV FDVH SRRUO\ LPSOHPHQWHG YLUWXDO
systems may afford scope for customers to µEUHDN IUHH¶ RI
their virtual system and access or directly affect the 
underlying Operating System or middleware/hypervisor. 
Clearly, it must be ensured that there is no information 
leakage from virtual machines and that attackers or malicious 
customers are not capable of breaking out of the virtual 
machine and gaining access to the host OS or the virtual 
machines of other customers [25]. 
The characteristics of these Cloud service offerings with 
associated security measures and the likely risk conditions 
are captured in Fig.2. The prospect of action from one Cloud 
user affecting another is described as intra-platform 
interference. 
 
IV. DIGITAL FORENSIC READINESS 
The numbers of cases of network intrusion and data 
EUHDFK DUH RQ WKH ULVH ³WKHUH LV D PDVVLYH LQFUHDVH LQ WKH
records being compromised by external hacking ± from 
roughly 49 million records in 2013 to 121 million and 
FRXQWLQJLQ´>@ 
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Figure 2: Summary of features, security measures and risks 
 
One positive effect of this growth in unauthorized data 
access is the raised awareness of digital forensics (DF) and a 
marked change in its perception from a solely post-event 
reactive investigative tool to a pro-active policy to establish 
intelligence capabilities in advance of any incidents.  This 
change in role reflects the concept of digital forensic 
readiness.  Thus, ³3UR-active DF management must ensure 
that all business processes are structured in such a way that 
essential data and evidence will be retained to ensure 
successful DF investLJDWLRQVVKRXOGDQLQFLGHQWRFFXU´ [27, 
p.18]. 
Naturally, this concept of digital forensic readiness is 
equally applicable to Cloud systems and novel techniques 
have been proposed to facilitate the data collection that this 
entails [28]. Yet, the Cloud context introduces particular 
problems with respect to forensic readiness. 
V. CLOUD FORENSIC RECOVERY 
Forensic readiness in the Cloud is complicated by the 
variety of contexts in which Cloud services are deployed and 
the diversity of software settings in which security risks may 
arise. Forensic readiness must accommodate these 
complexities and, in turn, this suggests that a single 
infrastructure-based digital forensic readiness solution may 
be infeasible. 
The primary reason for concern is the need to capture 
relevant data on system operation at the various operational 
levels of the Cloud system and any potential interaction 
across these levels.  This means capturing program logs, 
system logs and user activity logs.  In any end-customer 
Cloud facility, the data protected may not extend beyond any 
currently live information and data held in associated 
database systems.  The ready recycle capability of Cloud 
services also has implications for the persistence of digital 
forensic evidence. An intrusion that steals data from a virtual 
machine and then seeks to reset that machine may well 
succeed in destroying evidence of the intrusion, thereby 
removing any forensic traceability on the nature and quantity 
of stolen data. 
Neither is it sufficient to provide each distinct operational 
layer of Cloud systems with its own comprehensive forensic 
readiness.  At best, this condition will allow for forensic data 
recovery for that operational layer.  But there is no one-size-
fits-all solution that can capture all state, interaction and 
performance data such as would ensure full Cloud forensic 
recovery.  In fact, this insight reveals a fundamental problem 
that may impact upon Cloud forensic readiness. 
There are parallels here with issues in distributed systems 
and software DUFKLWHFWXUH  7KXV ³GLVWULEXWHG VRIWZDUH
systems are harder to debug than centralized systems due to 
the increased complexity and truly concurrent activity that is 
SRVVLEOH LQ WKHVH V\VWHPV´ > S @ 5HJDUGOHVV RI
whether the Cloud setting is truly distributed in its 
realisation, its interconnected software functional layers 
represent a unique challenge when attempting to interpret the 
relationship between events or changes actioned at one 
functional level and the operational impact of such changes 
on other functional aspects of the services afforded by that 
Cloud.  
When considering Cloud systems, from the perspective 
RI VRIWZDUH DUFKLWHFWXUH WKHUH PD\ EH DQ DVVXPSWLRQ RI µD
component- and message-EDVHGDUFKLWHFWXUDOVW\OH¶LQZKLFK
WKHUH LV µD SULQFLple of limited visibility or substrate 
independence: a component within the hierarchy can only be 
DZDUHRIFRPSRQHQWV³DERYH´LWDQGLVFRPSOHWHO\XQDZDUH
RIFRPSRQHQWVZKLFKUHVLGH³EHQHDWK´LW¶>S@ 
This multi-level interpretation problem is complicated by 
the fact that events considered anomalous at one level of 
service offering may arise through actions considered 
OHJLWLPDWH DW D µORZHU¶ OHYHO RI VRIWZDUH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
From the digital forensic readiness perspective, this 
underlines the requirement to go beyond capture of 
significant events across the Cloud service software and 
functional levels, since significance is an aspect that may 
cross the boundaries between such layers in the system as a 
whole. A hypothetical example may clarify this issue. 
A CSP customer may contract access to specific 
functional components (e.g., a Web service).  The 
operational characteristics of the service are under the 
control of the CSP and not the customer.  An authorised 
employee of the CSP may modify the algorithmic process 
and thereby affect the outcome of any service use by the 
customer.  While a change in operational behaviour of the 
service (i.e., an anomaly) may eventually be detected by the 
customer, there may be no anomalous activity evident at the 
level of CSP employee activity. The focus of subsequent 
forensic investigation may light initially on the nature of 
customer activity, since this is where the anomaly is 
apparent, but proper understanding of the issue requires that 
events across different functional levels of the Cloud system 
be apprehended. 
An informative view on this issue may be borrowed from 
Granular Computing [31], which aims to develop 
computational models of complex systems, such as human 
intelligence.  A key characteristic of this work is that it 
µstresses multiple views and multiple levels of understanding 
LQHDFKYLHZ¶>S@+HUHWKHHPSKDVLVLVXSRQµholistic, 
unified views, in contrast to isolated, fragmented views. To 
achieve this, we need to consider multiple hierarchies and 
PXOWLSOHOHYHOVLQHDFKKLHUDUFK\¶>RSFLWS@ 
Our proposal for adequate Cloud forensic readiness has 
two components.  Firstly, is the requirement for data capture.  
This is the obvious need to record any data at each layer of 
Cloud facility that may have a role to play in subsequent 
digital forensic analysis.  Secondly, the captured data must 
be stored off the system being monitored in a manner that 
both ensures the integrity of the logging and minimises the 
likelihood that the stored data can be compromised, either as 
DUHVXOWRIKRVWLOHDFWLRQRUµIULHQGO\ILUH¶ 
To achieve adequate data capture, we require µVWDWH
LQIRUPDWLRQ¶DQGGDWDPDQDJHPHQWDFURVVGLIIHULQJOHYHOVRI
any Cloud service, from the lowest software level up to the 
most abstracted µXVHUIDFLQJ¶software component.  On their 
own, such records will not be sufficient to fully capture the 
potential interplay of differing software levels.  For this 
purpose, subsequent digital forensic analytics will be 
required in order to establish a multi-dimensional 
representation of event chronology.  This means that 
timestamps from events and data captured at different 
software levels of abstraction will be correlated to determine 
how events across the Cloud system are related.  
Our requirement for secure and resilient log storage can 
build upon default system logging that will be present within 
the Cloud implementation but this must be supplemented to 
achieve log reliability.  
Instead of using centralised log servers, which of course 
are attractive targets and easy to spot for attackers, we 
propose a different approach. In order to prevent adversaries 
from manipulating log files to hide their tracks, we use 
chained Message Authentication Codes for each entry to the 
log file on each node. If state-of-the-art MACs are used, this 
makes it impossible to delete or manipulate text in the log 
files. Next, each node uses secret sharing techniques as 
proposed by Adi Shamir [32] to divide the log file into parts. 
These parts are then sent to random other nodes which store 
these log data. Even if an adversary succeeds in taking over 
some of the nodes, he will need a certain number of these 
fragments to reconstruct the log data. But since for each log 
entry different nodes are chosen randomly as stated before, 
the attacker effectively needs to control the whole Cloud 
ecosystem to stay hidden.  Further information on this 
solution can be found in our previous paper [33]. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
As organisations move increasingly away from locally 
hosted computer services toward Cloud-platforms, there is a 
corresponding need to ensure the forensic integrity of such 
instances. The primary reasons for concern are (i) the locus 
of responsibility, and (ii) the associated risk of legal sanction 
and financial penalty. In the first place, while Cloud service 
providers (CSPs) are responsible for the availability and 
robustness of their commercial offerings, they will not be 
responsible for the management of such services by their 
customers, nor for the data security associated with 
customer-level use of the Cloud services.  Responsibility for 
these aspects resides with WKH&63¶VFXVWRPHUVZKRVHGDWD
processing and data management are built upon the 
purchased Cloud services. In the second place, legislative 
demands on data protection, such as the forthcoming EU 
General Data Protection Regulation, will require companies 
to notify all breaches within 72 hours of discovery, or face 
significant financial penalty.  
These concerns can be addressed and the business risk 
mitigated through development of forensic readiness in 
customer-level Cloud systems. We have argued that this 
requires a range of logging and data capture facilities across 
the Cloud system software infrastructure that maintain the 
possibility of tracking activity at different levels of software 
abstraction (the multi-level interpretation problem). Our 
second proposition is that such digital forensic readiness 
must be combined with techniques to ensure that logged data 
is incorruptible and robust.  We have previously proposed 
techniques for intrusion monitoring that ensure log data 
credibility and provide robust decentralised log storage and 
recovery [33] for post-hack scenarios. 
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